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Abstract: 
 
The divergence that a firm manages to achieve because of its partners is a fundamental 
question in an alliance portfolio configuration. Diversity can refer not only to the 
differences between the focal firm and its partners or between the partners themselves 
but also to the differences arising from various resource endowments in the alliance 
portfolio. Understanding the significance of these different sources, how they 
interrelate, and how they affect the firm performance is an unresolved question as 
unclear definitions and opposing arguments are proposed. This paper expounds the 
concepts of partner heterogeneity, alliance portfolio diversity, and network resource 
complementarity to gain a deeper comprehension of the alliance portfolio configuration 
and how it affects performance. Our analysis of airline alliances at a global level reveals 
the central role of resource complementarity in the focal firm performance. 
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 1. Introduction 
Strategic alliances play a vital role in firm survival as long as they contribute 
external resources that allow firms to gain and maintain competitive advantages (Mu, 
Love & Peng, 2008). These external resources are referred to as network resources 
(Gulati, 2007). Access to them and their eventual use is a key motivation for the 
company to involve itself in interorganizational ties and alliance formation. 
In very competitive and highly fluctuating business environments, some 
organizations usually enter into multiple agreements with other firms to develop various 
competitive advantages simultaneously. The set of firm alliances is referred to as its 
alliance portfolio, and it generates a need for global and simultaneous management of 
all alliances so that the company achieves its objectives (Wassmer, 2010). Hoffmann 
(2007: 834) stated that alliance portfolio compositions “determine the quality, quantity, 
and diversity of information and resources to which the focal company has access.” In 
other words, the global firm’s network resource access will be determined by who its 
partners are (in different alliances) and by those partners’ resources. 
Previous literature about Network Theory and Resource-based view has highlighted 
that network resources to which a company has access through its relations should be 
complemented and/or combined with its own resources (Chung, Singh & Lee, 2000; 
Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Lavie, 2006; Mitsuhashi & Greve, 2009; Stuart, 
2000; Wassmer, 2007; Zheng, Li & Wu, 2013). Therefore, it is relevant to find partners 
that are different from the focal firm and partners with resources that differ from its own 
resources. 
Baum, Calabrese and Silverman (2000) previously indicated the need to configure 
alliance portfolios, within their classic conceptualization, to permit access to more 
divergent information and capabilities. Diversity, nonredundancy, synergy, and the 
breadth of partner resource characteristics are relevant elements connected to the 
company’s performance that form part of the research agenda on alliance portfolio 
configuration (Wassmer, 2010). In the recent literature, even greater interest has been 
expressed in evidence that shows how different aspects of the alliance portfolio 
configuration (particularly diversity and/or similarity between firms and between the 
resources that they own) affect company performance (Collins & Riley, 2013; Cui & 
O’Connor, 2012; De Leew, Lokshin, & Duysters, 2014; Duysters & Lokshin, 2011; 
Kim, 2014; Lavie, 2007; Sarkar, Aulakh, & Madhok, 2009).  
However, at a conceptual level, there is still a lack of clarity over the use of different 
words, and there are levels of analysis that describe the circumstances in which an 
alliance portfolio configuration improves performance. Words such as heterogeneity, 
diversity, or complementarity are used abundantly to refer to different situations and 
levels. On occasions, the different terms appear mixed up with the same definition: 
“Alliance partner heterogeneity refers to the breadth or diversity of the complementary 
capabilities held by different alliance participants” (Lin, 2012) and “Diversity refers to 
the heterogeneity of resources or knowledge and thus yields the potential for novel 
combinations to emerge” (Vanhaverbeke, Gilsing, Beerkens, & Duysters, 2009). 
Therefore, there is a need to clarify the concepts that are used in the previous literature 
before referring to the alliance portfolio diversity. 
Although the different sources can be broader and can refer to structural questions 
and to both geographic and cultural distances (Ahuja, Polidoro & Mitchell, 2009; Lavie 
& Miller, 2008), the previous literature has indicated that the basic divergence sources 
focus on the differences between both partners and resources (Gulati, Lavie & 
Madhavan, 2011; Kale & Singh, 2009). The differences between the alliance portfolio 
partners may arise between them or with the focal firm. Following previous papers on 
network approach strategy, this work centers on the different sources that, in a direct 
way, are linked to the network resources and understand network resource as partner 
resource endowment (Lavie, 2008). 
Earlier research has noted firm heterogeneity as a preliminary factor in the existence 
of complementarity, and both concepts are linked to business performance (Baum et al., 
2000; Burt, 1992; Lavie, 2006; Mitsuhashi & Greve, 2009; Wassmer, 2007). Other 
studies indicate the way in which company homogeneity stimulates innovation and 
improves results (Ahuja, 2000; Cui & O’Connor, 2012). Therefore, there is a certain 
controversy about what the best type of partner might be to improve the business 
performance. Previous studies have proposed arguments and evidence that indicate that 
holding a more diverse alliance portfolio and one contributing complementary resources 
yields positive or negative results or results that change over time. There are no reviews 
that discuss the different forms of differences that can arise in an alliance portfolio and 
how these forms are interrelated with each other (e.g., if some may be the antecedents or 
consequences of others). Therefore, there is a gap in the literature that covers the 
various ways of considering divergence or convergence in the alliance portfolio 
configuration, the possible connections between them, and how differences affect firm 
performance in different ways. 
The aim of this work is to look more deeply at the question of the alliance portfolio 
configuration following the lines marked out by Hoffmann (2007) and Wassmer (2010). 
The objective is to contribute to a better understanding of the relations between the three 
basic forms of understanding the differences in alliance portfolio configuration 
(heterogeneity between the focal firm and its partners, diversity between the partners, 
and resource complementarity) and how these (each one separately and in relation to 
each other) affect the business performance. Therefore, this work will seek to specify 
whether they are related in either a positive or a negative way to the results (or in a 
nonlinear way) and whether they do so directly or indirectly. Moreover, this paper 
defines these three forms of difference in an alliance portfolio. 
Codeshare alliances shared between airlines at an international level have been 
considered for this purpose, employing data from 135 alliance portfolios that include the 
main companies in the sector and represent over 70% of the total. 
 
2. Theoretical Review 
The problem of how the focal firm selects more or less different partners is a key in 
the study of alliance portfolios (Castro, Casanueva & Galán, 2014). The variety of 
partners and the divergence of the resources that they contribute are decisive for the 
alliance portfolio configuration (Hoffmann, 2007).  
However, the following key questions surround what we consider a different 
partner. How do we analyze the differences? What is the basis of those differences? 
Placing the focus on network resources (Gulati, 2007; Lavie, 2008), alliance portfolio 
divergence has been considered in numerous previous studies. A review of the literature 
shows that an unresolved conceptual problem exists over the name of each concept (see 
Appendix). 
In this research, three differentiated concepts are proposed to analyze divergence 
and convergence within an alliance portfolio: heterogeneity, portfolio diversity, and 
complementarity. We considered that heterogeneity refers to “how different the 
organization is from its partners” (Gulati et al., 2011), diversity is “the extent of 
variance in a focal firm’s alliance partners” (Collins & Riley, 2013), and 
complementarity is “the extent to which a partner contributes non-overlapping resources 
to the relationship” (Kale & Singh, 2009). 
Business networks have to be considered at two levels. The first is the dyadic level 
that relates the focal firm with each one of its partners and proposes whether they are 
different because of their characteristics or because of their resource endowment. The 
second is at the egonet level—alliance portfolio. At this level, the differences between 
the focal firm egonet members are considered: between their partners. A distinction 
should be made between whether the differences refer to the firm characteristics or to 
their resource endowment. 
Table 1 sets out a conceptual framework with which to analyze the difference in the 
alliance portfolio, which considers three sources of divergence: differences between the 
characteristics of either the firms or the resources and the consideration of two network 
levels (dyad and egonet). Each new partner choice in the alliance portfolio configuration 
is a commitment and has an effect at the dyadic level (specific alliance with the new 
partner) and at the global or network level as long as it shapes and modifies the egonet 
characteristics and structure (alliance portfolio). 
In Table 1, heterogeneity is linked to the existence of different attributes between 
two partners. It is a similar concept to the one used by Gulati et al. (2011), where they 
refer to differences between the firms’ characteristics that create an alliance and the 
Parkhe’s (1991) type II diversity. Therefore, heterogeneity focuses on the differences 
between dyadic pairs (focal company and each of their partners’ characteristics, one by 
one). Diversity centers on the ego network: all focal firm partners without the focal firm 
itself. In this way, the differences between the alliance portfolio members are 
considered, without considering focal organization characteristics. This definition of 
diversity is similar to those given by Collins and Riley (2013) and Jiang, Tao and 
Santoro (2010). Finally, complementarity refers to the comparison of the resource 
endowments (and the nature of those resources) between the focal firm and its partners. 
Complementarity refers to finding the resources that the focal firm needs in another firm 
when they find the ideal combination and their effect is greater together than it is 
individually (Gulati, 1999). If both the partners’ resources are similar, then those 
resources will be redundant (Huggins, 2010). 
With regard to the relations between these three divergence sources (partner 
heterogeneity, alliance portfolio diversity, and network resource complementarity), 
previous literature has sometimes resorted to one of those relations as a proxy for the 
other; at other times, these relations have coincided with each other and the results have 
had variable effects. Thus, some studies have considered heterogeneity as a synonym of 
diversity (Beckman & Haunschild, 2002; De Leeuw et al., 2014; Duysters & Lokshin, 
2011). In other studies, there is no clear separation between diversity and heterogeneity 
(Collins & Riley, 2013; Jiang et al., 2010). Various studies have linked 
complementarity to creating alliances with heterogeneous partners, which contribute to 
the minimization of the overlapping (Abuzaid, 2014; Chung et al., 2000; Duysters & 
Lokshin, 2011; Kale & Singh, 2009; Kim, 2014; Shan & Hamilton, 1991). Therefore, it 
is necessary to understand how each alliance portfolio divergence source (separately 
and combination with the others) affects firm performance. 
 
Table 1: Alliance portfolio divergence sources  
 Partner 
Heterogeneity/Homogeneity  
Alliance Portfolio 
Diversity/Similarity 
Network Resource 
Complementarity/Redundancy 
Network 
level 
Dyad Egonet Dyad 
Object of Firms Firms Firm resources 
the 
difference 
Object of 
comparison 
Focal firm characteristics vs. 
partner characteristics 
Differences between 
all partner 
characteristics, 
without including the 
focal firm  
Focal firm resources vs. 
partners’ resources  
 
2.1. Partner heterogeneity and performance 
Heterogeneity means that the focal company characteristics have to be compared 
with each one of their alliance portfolio partners. The main argument that links 
heterogeneity to performance is directly linked to resources. Previous works have 
defined heterogeneity in opposition to homogeneity and have argued that the most 
valuable firms are companies that have heterogeneous partners as those organizations 
are more efficient and contribute different resources that encourage the competitive 
advantages development (Ahuja et al., 2009; Baum et al., 2000; Beckman & 
Haunschild, 2002; Lee, 2007; Parkhe, 1991; Wuyts, Dutta & Stremersch, 2004). In 
other words, a company must have allies that bring in new resources—different from 
those that it already has—to improve its performance (Baum et al., 2000; Burt, 1992; 
Gulati et al., 2011; Mitsuhashi & Greve, 2009; Reagan & Zuckerman, 2008). 
Another important argument on how heterogeneity favors the alliance performance 
centers on the difficulty of cooperation between peers. An alliance with direct 
competitors implies that they are homogenous to focal firm, which can provoke 
numerous conflicts as they collide in the pursuit of their aims that erode the relationship 
(Baum et al., 2000; Caner & Tyler, 2013; De Leeuw et al., 2014; Gomes-Casseres, 
1994; Lavie, 2006; Park, Srivastava & Gnyawali, 2014) and generate opportunistic 
behavior (Gulati, Nohria, & Zaheer, 2000). Hitt, Hoskisson and Kim (2001) identified 
that homogeneous firms are not able to exploit all the alliance opportunities. 
It seems that heterogeneous collaborations are more valuable owing to their enlarged 
range of available resources and what that implies: more flexibility to adapt to 
environment changes because of different competitive advantages created through 
combinations of very different resources. These combinations are also almost inimitable 
because of the combination uniqueness, and in the last instance, they could, according 
to Dyer (1996), increase their productivity. 
However, there are also theoretical arguments and evidence in the literature that 
show that firm heterogeneity can have a negative effect on performance and is linked to 
an increase in the costs. Heterogeneity involves a high cost too because a company has 
to invest more resources to overcome the differences, and these costs reduce the alliance 
performance (Baum et al., 2000; Collins & Riley, 2013; De Leeuw et al., 2014). 
Despite the above, it seems that the type of partner that prompts better performance 
will depend on the type of resources that the focal firm wishes to obtain. Grant and 
Baden-Fuller (2004) showed that if the wish is to access physical or tangible resources, 
such as markets (Kogut, 1988), the best option will be to associate with heterogeneous 
partners as the alliance partner produces a pooling of resources that will generate 
multiple benefits; thus, the focal firm expands into various markets. On the contrary, if 
the idea is to improve the value chain or to innovate, the best approach is to choose 
homogenous partners, contacts that will cause cospecialization in the company and a 
convergence process (Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004; Jiang et al., 2010; Park et al., 2014), 
because convergent firms learn in more effective ways (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Rogers, 
1995) and are better at the cocreation processes (Park et al., 2014). 
Thus, there are arguments that point to both a positive and negative relation between 
partner heterogeneity and focal firm performance; even a nonlinear relation between 
heterogeneity and performance is possible. Therefore, a better understanding is required 
about the type of relation that appears between these variables without proposing the 
relation sign a priori. Accordingly, we may establish the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Alliance partner heterogeneity is related to the focal firm performance. 
 
2.2. Alliance portfolio diversity and performance 
Alliance portfolio diversity compares focal firm partners with each other (their 
similarities and differences without taking the focal firm into account). In an egonet 
analysis, diversity is the variety of the partners that participate in the alliance portfolio. 
Reversely, similarity implies all portfolio partners fit in the same profile. 
The motives that drive the alliance portfolio creation usually focus on obtaining 
network resources because they help create different competitive advantages, react 
better to environmental changes (Dess, Rasheed, McLaughlin, & Priem, 1995; Duysters, 
De Man, & Wildeman, 1999; Lahiri & Narayanan, 2013), to innovate (Golonka, 2015), 
and reduce costs (Bettis, Bradley & Hamel, 1992; Lahiri & Narayanan, 2013). 
Therefore, it would be logical to think that owning multiple partners that contribute very 
varied resources between each other will increase the possibilities for different and 
original competitive advantages development. These competitive advantages will be 
based on combinations that competitors are unable to imitate (Beckman & Haunschild, 
2002; Collins & Riley, 2013; Duysters, Heimeriks, Lokshin, Meijer & Sabidussi, 2012; 
Faems, De Visser, Andries & Van Looy, 2010; Hoffman, 2007; Jiang et al., 2010; Kim, 
2014; Lahiri & Narayanan, 2013). 
The level of alliance portfolio diversity has caused certain researchers concern 
because a high level of diversity can imply high costs (De Leeuw et al., 2014; Duysters 
& Lokshin, 2011; Faems et al., 2010; Lahiri & Narayanan, 2013; Park et al., 2014) and 
great effort in alliance coordination and in decisions about portfolio configuration to 
avoid conflicts and incompatibilities (Collins & Riley, 2013). Some studies show that 
alliance portfolio diversity is only positive up to a certain point (Duysters & Lokshin, 
2011; Koka & Prescott, 2002). Nevertheless, if they overcome the difficulties, for 
example, with a special alliance function dedicated to coordinate and to facilitate 
resource exchanges (Dyer, Kale & Singh, 2001; Faems et al., 2010; Kale, Dyer & 
Singh, 2002), firms will share various resources, and those assets will, in turn, give 
them strategic flexibility to get a better market position and will also increase their 
survival, allowing them to obtain better performance (Collins & Riley, 2013; Hamel, 
Doz & Prahalad, 1989).  
Once again, as with heterogeneity, previous studies advanced both evidence and 
arguments that indicate the positive relation between alliance portfolio diversity and 
focal firm performance, whereas others showed that diversity is only positive up to a 
certain level or that it can be negative. Therefore, our hypothesis suggests the relation 
between both variables without presupposing the relation sign: 
 
H2: Alliance portfolio diversity will be related to focal firm performance. 
 
2.3. Network resources complementarity and performance 
Most of the alliance portfolio configuration has focused on the differences between 
firms. However, on many occasions, the essential argument was the resource search that 
they do not own. Complementarity refers to the differences between focal firm 
resources and their partner assets. In other words, complementarity refers to partners 
with a resource endowment that focal firm does not possess that are nonoverlapping and 
synergic with those that it does own. Synergy implies that two resources are 
complementary when their joint performance, which they generate together, is greater 
than each one by itself (Milgrom & Roberts, 1990).  
Resource complementarity is decisive in an alliance as such a combination of 
resources manages to generate effects that are superior to that generated by the 
resources separately by each partner. In addition, if this combination is inimitable, it 
will achieve advantages over the other rivals. We may add that a firm with an alliance 
portfolio can even solely combine resources from various partners or with its own, 
making it more difficult for others to manage to imitate such a combination. 
In different studies, the idea that network resource complementarity guarantees the 
alliance success has been tested as it increases the company value and the level of firm 
performance (Chung et al., 2000; De Leeuw et al., 2014; Kale & Singh, 2009; Wassmer, 
2007; Zheng et al., 2013). Other studies have even affirmed that complementarity 
should be considered before the alliance formation and that it influences performance 
(Chung et al., 2000; Gulati, 1995; Gulati, 2007; Kim, 2014; Lavie, 2007; Zheng et al., 
2013). 
If complementarity is important at a dyadic level, it is also important at the level of 
the alliance portfolio. Thus, different researchers emphasized that when incorporating 
new alliances, the new complementarities that they will contribute should be carefully 
examined to see whether they will cause any conflict with the previous members (Caner 
& Tyler, 2013; Wassmer, 2007) and whether they will create less value. 
Nevertheless, there are companies that prefer redundant resources, particularly in 
knowledge and information, because they bring a higher level of trust and reliability 
(Gulati, 2007; Lee, 2007). Dussauge, Garrette and Mitchell (2000) detailed that the 
partners in a large-scale alliance tend to cooperate with those with similar resources and 
skills. Ahuja et al. (2009) proposed a nonmonotonic resource similarity effect on 
alliance formation. Once again, the relation between complementarity and performance 
is not clearly established in the literature, producing contexts where it is better to obtain 
partner redundant resources and where the relation might not be linear. Therefore, we 
propose the following hypothesis:  
 
H3: Alliance resource complementarity will be related to the focal firm 
performance. 
 
Moreover, in light of the above, complementarity is usually associated with 
heterogeneity and diversity because it is believed that a focal firm will seek different 
resources to those that it already has when it creates an alliance. Thus, the 
heterogeneous partners are the ones who provide the resources that differ from the focal 
company resources. Some studies such as those by Baum et al. (2000), Lavie (2007), 
Burt (1992), Sakakibara (1997), Mitsuhashi and Greve (2009) and Wassmer (2007) 
indicate this tendency. Complementarity is therefore defined in opposition to partner 
overlapping and network redundancy and inefficacy (Abuzaid, 2014; Lin, 2012), caused 
by company homogeneity, which leads us to think that heterogeneity will generate 
further complementarity. Moreover, alliance portfolio diversity—or egonet diversity—
implies multiple sources that will generate benefits from the created synergies (Duysters 
& Lokshin, 2011). In other words, heterogeneous partners and alliance portfolio 
diversity will mean that the firm has different and complementary resources to its own 
because partner and resource redundancy is either eliminated or severely limited. 
Finally, complementarity may also be said to have a mediatory effect in the relation that 
both partner heterogeneity and alliance portfolio diversity have with performance. 
Therefore, we propose the following hypotheses: 
 
H4a: The more the partner’s heterogeneity, the more likely they will be able to 
achieve complementary resources. 
 
H4b: The greater the alliance portfolio diversity, the greater the likelihood of them 
achieving more complementary resources.  
 
H5a: Resource complementarity in an alliance portfolio mediates the relation 
between partner heterogeneity and focal firm performance. 
 
H5b: Resource complementarity in an alliance portfolio mediates the relation 
between alliance portfolio diversity and focal firm performance. 
 
3. Methods 
3.1. Sample 
The airline industry was selected for our analysis of how these three aspects (partner 
heterogeneity, alliance portfolio diversity, and resource complementarity) influence 
performance. In the airline business, there is a multitude of alliances and other 
collaborative agreements between firms and large international groups that operate 
around the world and compete at a global level. Airlines enter into simultaneous alliance 
agreements with a relatively large number of airline companies such that the portfolio 
joint management is also a standard practice. In this way, the multiple networks created 
in this industry may be examined. Although interfirm collaboration has existed in this 
sector ever since its creation, the process has speeded up over recent years, with the 
alliance and group emergence operating together. It is a widely used context in the 
strategic alliance analysis (Casanueva, Gallego & Sancho, 2013; Gimeno, 2004; 
Gomes-Cassares, 1994; Lazzarini, 2007; Shah & Swaminathan, 2008; Wassmer, 2007). 
In addition, the airline sector permits a clear identification of the key resources that 
define competition within it. More specifically, if we consider only market resources, 
destinations to which the airlines fly and their routes represent one of the most relevant 
resources in the industry’s success (Wassmer, 2007). However, destinations have other 
added components that involve physical resources such as land-based services, 
maintenance, and so on. Therefore, airline sector allows the proposed relations to be 
studied, both because of the clear identification of each alliance that participates in the 
alliance portfolio and the possibility of sharing with the partners.  
In this study, if two airlines entered into a codeshare agreement, an alliance was 
considered to exist between them (Min & Mitsuhashi, 2012). A codeshare means an 
airline can sell seats to its clients on the other company’s flights with which it has an 
agreement. This arrangement means that an airline company can fly to destinations that 
it does not itself offer because of its alliances with its partners. In a codeshare alliance 
that is shared, partners can incorporate the destination in its routes, but the resource 
remains under the control of the firm that holds it. In this industry, destinations are a 
key resource, whether understood as an element in a network structure or as a market 
(Wassmer & Dussauge, 2012). 
3.2. Data 
Data from the largest 200 firms in the industry, reported by Airline Business journal, 
were used in the study. Within this set of firms, there were some groups, which meant 
that a total of 214 airline companies were actually selected. Finally, those that had no 
codeshare agreements were filtered out, leaving a total of 135 airline companies with a 
turnover of 75% of the total industry income. 
The data required to perform the study were compiled on the 135 firms that 
constitute the 135 portfolios under analysis. In total, over 1700 codeshare agreements 
were identified among them. The datasets for the identification of the alliances were 
extracted from the databases of Air Transportation Intelligence, Business-Alliance 
Survey, and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) corresponding to 2011, 
facilitated by Flightglobal, and a time series updated to 2012 was used for other sorts of 
operative, financial, and traffic data. 
The relational data that permitted the construction of the alliance portfolio were 
sourced from the Business-Alliance Survey. This information implies a data set that has 
been used in conventional works and has been updated every year for over a decade 
(Gimeno, 2004). As these data sources are many and varied, they were compared with 
the programmed codeshares in GDS, published in the Airline Route report of August 8, 
2011. The congruency of the codeshare alliances in the study was almost complete. The 
data on the destinations were obtained from the individual records of each airline 
included in the Flightglobal database. The operational, financial, and traffic data were 
consulted from those same records but with a 2-year difference, which had been 
obtained from ICAO and from the annual reports of the airlines. Complete data were 
available, but the financial information presented here is standardized in dollars as they 
are published in the local currency (indicating the exchange rate at each point in time). 
Other historic data on the airlines (employees, destinations, and types of airline) were 
also individually consulted in those records. In a few cases, where the database 
presented no up-to-date or reliable data on the number of employees and on the 
particular destinations of some small partners of the 135 airlines under analysis, those 
partners were not considered as they represented only a very small part of the 1700 
alliances under analysis. 
 
3.3. Variables 
3.3.1. Dependent variable 
1) Results: Operating results are an acknowledged reference in the airline sector and 
were used as an indicator to study performance. Operating results were measured in a 
similar way to Casanueva et al. (2013). The companies’ total turnover throughout 2009–
2012 was used to calculate results expressed in monetary and physical terms (Assaf and 
Josiassen, 2012). We selected 2012 because that year reflects the alliance performance 
in earlier years. The used indicators were as follows: 
a) Mingpaskm: income per passenger transported over kilometers flown. This ratio 
is often employed to express demand for each company in the airline industry. It 
expresses the income generated by passenger traffic. 
b) Loadfactor: this variable indicates the passengers per kilometer flown in relation 
to available seat kilometers. Therefore, it implies a capacity utilization measure in the 
industry (Lazzarini, 2007). 
c) Operating result (MResOper): yielded by the difference between income and 
operating costs. These come from its own business activity. 
 
3.3.2. Independent variables 
1) Heterogeneity: Heterogeneity is a measure of the differences between the focal 
firm’s characteristics and each one of their partners’ characteristics. It may be measured 
by airline type or segment in which the airline operates, its size, the number of its 
destinations, and airplane fleet. Four indicators of heterogeneity are therefore presented: 
a) Heterogeneity by type of airline (hAirlines): its indicator is the percentage of focal 
firm partners that belong to subsectors other than that of the focal firm with regard to all 
of the focal firm partners. The database distinguished five subsectors: low-cost 
companies, region, charter, major carriers, and airline freight carriers. First, the average 
number of different companies by type of subsector with which the focal firm has 
established a codeshare alliance was calculated up until 2011. When there was no 
subsector coincidence between the focal company and the partner, it was assigned a 
value of 1 and otherwise 0. Then, heterogeneity was established with regard to the total 
number of alliances; in other words, the global estimate of the focal airline company 
partners divided by the number of partners not from the same subsector as the focal 
firm. 
 
 
 
The calculation of the indicators is illustrated by taking the example of a fictitious 
airline (Airfocal) that maintains relations with another four, whose characteristics are 
given in Table 2. The calculations of the different indicators that will be covered to 
measure heterogeneity, diversity, and complementarity are given in Table 3. In Table 3, 
the indicator hAirlines has a value of 0.25 for Airfocal. 
 
Table 2: Example of the airline Airfocal portfolio 
Name  Airline 
type 
Number of 
employees 
Number of 
destinations 
Fleet Shared 
destinations   
Airfocal Major 10000 50 100  
Airpartner Major 20000 200 300 30 
Airregional Low cost 3000 30 50 25 
Airallied Major 15000 100 150 20 
Aircoop Major 10000 70 150 0 
 
Table 3: Example of the calculation for the airline Airfocal indicators 
Variable Result 
hAirlines 
 
hrelSize 
 
hrelDestinations 
 
hrelFleet 
 
divAirline 
 
divSize 
 
divDestinations 
 
divFleet 
 
CompleAbs 
 
CompleFocal 
 
 
b) Heterogeneity by size (hrelSize): first, we calculated the average number of 
employees in each company between 2004 and 2011. Then, we found the differences 
between the average size in the focal firm and each of its partners in the codeshare 
agreements. We also calculated the sum of the average number of employees in the 
focal firm and in each of its partners and divided the absolute value of the differences by 
the totals for each partner. We then totaled all these divisions. Finally, we divided the 
resulting number by the total number, ‘N’, of the codeshare alliances of the focal firm. 
Ht(hrelSize) =   
where 
Mei is the average number of employees between 2004 and 2011 in the focal firm, 
Mej, k to n is the average from 2004 to 2011 of the employees in company j, k, or n, 
which are focal firm partners in codeshare agreements, 
N is the total number of codeshare alliances into which focal firm has formed. 
The result for Airfocal was 0.268. 
c) Heterogeneity by a number of destinations (hrelDestinations): this is similar to 
the previous one, however, considering the number of destinations in each alliance in 
2011. In other words, it is the average total of each ratio that was obtained by 
calculating the difference between the destinations of two partners divided by the sum 
of the destinations that link them both. 
Ht(hrelDestinations) =   
where 
Di is the number of focal firm destinations in 2011, 
Dj, k to n is the number of companies j, k, and n destinations in 2011, which are focal 
firm partners in codeshare agreements, and N is the total number of focal firm 
codeshare alliances. 
This indicator yielded a value of 0.338, as given in Table 3. 
d) Heterogeneity by fleet (hrelFleet): this is calculated in a similar way to that of 
previous ones but considering each company’s fleet in 2011. In the same way as in the 
preceding cases, it is the measure of the ratios obtained by calculating the absolute 
difference between the fleets of each alliance of the focal firm and the sum of the fleets 
of each dyad. 
Hf(hrelFleet) =   
where 
Fi is the number of planes owned by focal firm i in 2011 
Fj, k to n is the number of planes owned by the partners j, k, and n, which are focal 
firm (i) codeshare partners. 
N is the total number of focal firm codeshare alliances. 
The value yielded for Airfocal was 0.308. 
 
2) Diversity: the degree to which the focal firm partners (its egonet members) differ 
between each other—without including the focal firm—should be confirmed before 
studying their diversity. The indicators were based on measures of diversity between the 
alliance portfolio member characteristics. Four indicators of diversity were constructed 
between the portfolio airlines: 
a) Diversity by type of airline (divAirlines): using the coefficient of diversity 
suggested by Blau (Blau, 1977; Gulati, 1999):  
divAirline=1 - ∑pia
2
,  
where  
pia is the proportion existing in the alliance portfolio of each type of airline 
according to the subsector to which it belongs. Thus, the diversity existing between the 
group was measured as this coefficient expresses the extent to which the portfolio 
members differ between each other, where 1 is the maximum diversity in the group and 
0 the minimum (or the maximum similarity). 
b) Diversity by size (divSize): we used the coefficient of variation, i.e., a measure of 
relative distribution, in particular, the standard and average deviation. In other words, 
 
where 
t is the arithmetic mean of the number of employees of all the partners of the focal 
firm, without counting the focal firm itself. The average number of employees in each 
partner between 2004 and 2011 was calculated to establish the number of their 
employees. 
t is the standard deviation with regard to the earlier measure. 
In this way, if the standard deviation were 0, it would be because all the partners had 
the same number of employees, in which case there would be minimum diversity: the 
higher the value of  in relation to 0, the greater the diversity. 
c) Diversity by a number of destinations (divDestinations): this is similar to the 
previous ones but considering the destinations of the portfolio members as of 2011. In 
other words, we used the coefficient of variation, for which purpose we calculated the 
average number of destinations held by the alliance portfolio partners (excluding the 
focal firm) and the standard deviation between them. 
 
d is the arithmetic mean of the number of destinations in 2011 of all the partners of 
the focal firm, without counting the focal firm.  
d is the standard deviation with regard to the earlier measure. 
d) Diversity by fleet (divFleet): this is similar to the previous ones but on this 
occasion, considering the portfolio members fleet in 2011 (excluding focal firm). In 
other words, we calculated the coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by 
the average) of the fleet owning by all the alliance portfolio partners without 
considering focal firm. 
 
where 
d is the arithmetic average of the fleets owning by all the alliance portfolio 
members without counting focal firm. 
d is the standard deviation of the earlier measure. 
The value of the four preceding indicators of diversity for Airfocal was 0.374, 0.605, 
0726, and 0.634 as given in Table 3. 
 
3) Complementarity: this variable measures access through the alliance to partner 
resources not owned by focal firm. The resources are complementary when they are not 
redundant, in other words, when the other company does not possess them. 
Nonredundant resources permit greater synergy. The selected resource is the set of 
partner destinations that each company can access, which may be seen as the markets 
that each airline penetrates (Wassmer & Dussauge, 2012). Complementarity is defined 
as access to destinations to which the focal company had not transported passengers 
before. Therefore, two airlines will be absolutely complementary when they share no 
destination. In addition to eliminating redundancy in the destination network, this 
complementarity enlarges the places to which each company can travel, completing its 
route network, which generates synergic effects for the airline. Set theory was employed 
to measure this variable: 
a) Complementarity: the variable measures the percentage of different destinations 
between each other that the focal firm has with each of its partners with regard to the 
total number of destinations that they all have between each other. It is calculated as a 
measure of all coefficients of the rest of the union and the intersection of the sets of two 
airlines destinations divided between the union of both sets (Mitsuhashi & Greve, 
2009). Expressed as:  
 
where 
A is the set of destinations of the focal firm 
Bj is the set of destinations of each of the partners j in code-share alliances. 
A U Bj represents the sum of the set of destinations of the focal firm and its partner 
(shared and separate) 
A ∩ Bj represents the set of common destinations between the focal firm and its 
partner 
N is the number of partners in code-share alliances with the focal firm. 
This indicator yielded a value of 0.814 for Airfocal. 
b) Focal complementarity: complementarity can also be analyzed from the partner’s 
point of view; if focal firm has resources that are complementary to its own, the partner 
will be more willing to ally itself and/or to share its resources with focal firm. 
Therefore, the extent to which a firm is complementary for its partners was also 
measured, which was done with the coefficient of the set of focal firm destinations 
minus the intersection of the sets under consideration, divided by the first airline 
destinations: 
 
The value of this indicator for Airfocal would be 0.575 (Table 3). 
 
3.3.3. Control variables: 
1) Age: this variable represents the firm ages that constitute the sample. The 
reference year for age was taken as 2011. 
2) Fleet: it represents the firm size in terms of the number of its planes that are 
operative in 2011. 
3) Size: it represents each airline alliance portfolio size; in other words, the number 
of partners with which they maintain codeshare agreements. 
 4. Results 
The partial least squares (PLS) method was used to analyze the data because of the 
model complexity (several constructs and indicators) and its causal predictive character 
(Chin & Newsted, 1999). As indicated earlier, our sample contains 135 airlines. 
Reinartz, Haenlein and Henseler (2009) pointed out that PLS is suitable for our size 
sample (<250). Moreover, PLS is considered the most appropriate method to treat 
datasets of secondary data, which in our case were extracted from the database (Gefen, 
Rigdon, & Straub, 2011). 
 
Figure 2: PLS model. 
 
 
Figure 2 represents the structural model. The relations between the basic variables 
that allow us to test our hypotheses (heterogeneity, diversity, and complementarity and 
the results) with their indicators, but also three control variables and another three allow 
us to analyze the quadratic effects. In hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, neither the type of relation 
between heterogeneity, diversity, and complementarity is specified in the results nor is 
its sign and the nonlinear effect of these relations are analyzed in the model. The two-
stage approach was used to analyze the quadratic effects (Henseler, Fassott, Dijkstra & 
Wilson, 2012). 
In a structural equation model, all constructs (latent variables) were associated with 
a set of indicators that can have either a reflective or a formative association with those 
constructs. A reflective relation implies that the indicators are a representation of the 
construct. A formative relation implies that the indicators produce or contribute to the 
construct (Fornell, 1982). In the aforementioned case, the measures or indicators 
represent characteristics that collectively explain the content of the construct. Following 
the recommendations given by Jarvis, MacKenzie and Podsakoff (2003), the model 
indicators and variables were evaluated, and in the light of certain criteria, they were 
considered formative. There are studies that have used this same option for similar 
variables to those of the proposed model (Crosby, Evans & Cowles, 1990; Jarvis et al., 
2003). 
In the evaluation of the measurement model, the formative variables do not need to 
be correlated, and it is assumed that they are error free, so the traditional evaluation of 
reliability and validity is not considered applicable (Bagozzi, 1994). In contrast with the 
analysis of the models based on reflective indicators, those based on formative 
indicators are less formalized, and different strategies should be considered 
(Diamantopoulos & Siguaw, 2006; Petter, Straub & Rai, 2007). The possible problems 
of multicollinearity should be considered to estimate reliability. The variance inflation 
factor (VIF) (Diamantopoulos & Siguaw, 2006) was used, which should be below 3.3. 
In Table 4, we can see that all the indicators are below that level.  
 
Table 4: Measurement model and indicator weights VIF values 
 
 
VIF Weights t Statistics P Values 
CompleAbs 2.521 −0.965 4.132 0.000 
CompleFocal 2.521 1.544 7.110 0.000 
MIngPasKm 1.460 1.143 16.253 0.000 
MLoadFactor 1.219 −0.144 1.122 0.262 
MResOper 1.239 −0.281 2.525 0.012 
divAirlines 1.217 0.424 2.157 0.031 
divDestinations 2.720 0.431 1.466 0.143 
divFleet 1.608 0.298 1.540 0.124 
divSize 3.129 0.142 0.511 0.609 
hAirlines 1.307 −0.618 1.134 0.257 
hrelDestinations 1.412 0.383 0.937 0.349 
hrelFleet 1.201 0.207 0.648 0.517 
hrelSize 1.461 0.785 1.499 0.134 
 
The next step was to analyze the validity of the construct (Petter et al., 2007). The 
analysis of the indicator weights and their meaning is given in Table 4. We can see that 
there are various indicators with insignificant weights. Following the criteria given by 
Hair et al (2014), all those indicators with loadings above 0.5 should be retained in the 
model. If we analyze the factor loading with insignificant weights (Table 5), the only 
indicators that we would have to eliminate would be MLoadFactor and hAirlines. 
Nevertheless, given the information that they contain, we decided to retain them in the 
study to avoid altering the conceptual domain of the formative construct (Jarvis et al., 
2003; Roberts & Thatcher, 2009). 
 
Table 5: Loading indicator 
 
 
Loads 
MLoadFactor -> RESULTS 0.214 
divDestinations -> DIVERSITY 0.867 
divFleet -> DIVERSITY 0.689 
divSize -> DIVERSITY 0.816 
hAirlines -> HETEROGENEITY −0.137 
hrelDestinations -> HETEROGENEITY 0.610 
hrelFleet -> HETEROGENEITY 0.528 
hrelSize -> HETEROGENEITY 0.729 
 
Having analyzed the measurement model, we moved on to the structural model. 
First, we analyzed construct multicollinearity. In Table 6, we see VIF statistic for the 
constructs. In this case, VIF value should be below 5 (Hair et al., 2014). All constructs 
complied with this criterion. 
 
Table 6: Structural model VIF values 
 
  COMPLEMENTARITY RESULTS 
COMPLEMENTARITY 
 
2.207 
complementarity2 
 
2.186 
DIVERSITY 1.006 1.566 
diversity
2
 
 
1.288 
HETEROGENEITY 1.006 1.250 
heterogeneity
2
 
 
1.401 
RESULTS 
  
age 
 
1.131 
fleet 
 
1.138 
size 
 
1.540 
 
Finally, we evaluated the path coefficients that showed the relations between the 
variables. To do so, bootstrapping was applied to 5000 samples (Hair et al., 2014). The 
results are given in Table 7. The explained variance (R
2
) reached a level of 0.293 for 
complementarity and 0.470 for the results. Those values are above the minimum of 0.1, 
as indicated by some authors (Chin, 1998; Falk & Miller, 1992), and even 0.25 that Hair 
et al (2014) recommended.  
With regard to the control variables, the only one that showed a significant and 
positive relation with the results (β = 0.454 and p = 0.000) was size. This result means 
that airlines improve their results in relation to their portfolio size, in other words, when 
the number of partners increases.  
If we analyze the linear relations, neither heterogeneity (H1) nor diversity (H2) has a 
significant relation with the results. Moreover, heterogeneity is not associated with 
complementarity in a significant way (H4a). We do see a significant and positive 
relation (β = 0.394 and p = 0.000) between diversity and complementarity (H4b), 
indicating that the greater the differences between the partners that constitute the 
alliance portfolio, the higher the probability of obtaining complementary resources. 
Finally, complementarity is the only variable that shows a significant linear relation 
with the results (β = 0.512 and p = 0.000), indicating that the more complementary the 
alliance portfolio resources, the better the firm performance (H3). 
 
Table 7: Path coefficients  
 
 
Path 
coeff.  
t statistics P Values 
COMPLEMENTARITY -> 0.512 5.003 0.000 
RESULTS 
complemantarity
2
 -> RESULTS 0.124 2.150 0.032 
DIVERSITY -> 
COMPLEMENTARITY 
0.394 3.849 0.000 
DIVERSITY -> RESULTS −0.026 0.270 0.787 
diversity
2
 -> RESULTS 0.025 0.347 0.728 
HETEROGENEITY -> 
COMPLEMENTARITY 
−0.342 1.174 0.240 
HETEROGENEITY -> 
RESULTS 
0.149 0.872 0.384 
heterogeneity
2
 -> RESULTS −0.011 0.223 0.823 
age -> RESULTS 0.157 1.494 0.135 
fleet -> RESULTS −0.050 0.615 0.538 
size -> RESULTS 0.454 4.949 0.000 
 
If we analyze the nonlinear relations, we see that complementarity is the only one 
that continues its significant relation with the results (β = 0.124 and p = 0.032). As the 
sign is positive, we have a U-shaped relation. This result shows that complementarity 
between the focal firm resources and its partners’ resources generates better results for 
that firm if that complementarity is quite small or quite large, whereas intermediate 
levels of complementarity affect the results to a lesser degree. 
Moreover, a more detailed analysis of the relations in the model allows us to analyze 
the mediating role of complementarity in the relations between partner heterogeneity 
and alliance portfolio diversity with regard to the firm performance. To do so, we used 
the analysis suggested by Castro & Roldán (2013) and Real, Roldán & Leal (2014). In 
this way, the values are examined to see whether those obtained in the bootstrapping 
process of 5000 subsamples of the indirect relations (yielded by multiplying the values 
obtained in the relation heterogeneity results by complementarity results and diversity 
results by complementarity results) taking 0 as a value, at a confidence level of 95%, for 
which purpose percentiles of 2.5 and 97.5 were applied (Chin, 2010; Hayes, 2009; 
Williams & MacKinnon, 2008). In the case where some of these intervals contain a 
negative number, it means that it is inclusive of the value 0, so the relation of 
intermediation is not significant. The data show that this condition is only met in the 
relation in which alliance portfolio diversity and results are mediated by network 
resource complementarity, having an estimated value of 0.202, whereas the percentile 
2.5 assumed a value of 0.089 and the percentile 97.5 assumed a value of 0.265. We 
managed to demonstrate hypothesis 5b, although 5a did not have sufficient support. 
Finally, indicator f
2
 for the constructs that were significant obtained the following 
values: 0.224 for complementarity results, 0.060 for complementarity
2
 results, 0.218 for 
diversity complementarity, and 0.252 for size results. In line with Cohen (1988), values 
of between 0.15 and 0.35 indicate a moderate size effect. Therefore, only the quadratic 
relation of alliance portfolio diversity with network resource complementarity has a 
small effect. This result shows a greater explanatory power of the linear relations rather 
than the nonlinear relations included in the model. 
 
5. Conclusions and discussion 
The analysis of the 135 global airlines alliance portfolios configured on the basis of 
their codeshare alliances has provided an insight into the consequences of the three 
divergence sources for these alliance portfolios. Moreover, divergence sources are 
linked to network resources and firm performance. In particular, the analysis has charted 
the way in which partner heterogeneity, alliance portfolio diversity between, and key 
network resource complementarity in codeshare alliances (destinations) affects the 
airline operating results. These results have shown support for some, but not all, of the 
relations presented in the hypotheses. 
First, it has been confirmed that the network resource complementarity between 
partners influences better performance achievement at an operational level (H3). The 
influence of complementarity in the results is greater if network resource 
complementarity is quite low or quite high, as shown in the analysis of the quadratic 
effects. These results contribute new evidence to the debate about whether a better 
performance is linked to obtaining partner redundant resources that are supplementary 
to those the focal firm already has or, on the contrary, whether it is linked to obtaining 
complementary resources that produce synergies. The results suggest that some 
portfolios function well when similar resources are accumulated to those that the focal 
firm already owns. This is consistent with the previous arguments that partners that give 
the firm a higher level of confidence and reliability are sought (Gulati, 2007; Lee, 
2007). Another factor that can explain the curvilinear form of the relation is that the 
firms can use link alliances (in which the complementary resources will be important; 
this kind of alliance fits in our dyadic alliance between heterogeneous partners or our 
diverse alliance portfolio) or scale alliances (in which the firms tend to ally themselves 
with firms that have similar resources; this type of alliance corresponds with our dyadic 
alliance between homogeneous partners or our similar alliance portfolio) (Dussauge et 
al., 2000). According to a previous argument, Garrette, Dussage, Castañer and Mulotte 
(2007) suggest that domain-specific know-how generates better performance in scale 
alliances. Therefore, our results suggest that firms should be specialized in one type of 
alliance. That can be explained because companies reach their own best performance 
when they are specialized in homogeneous (similar) partners—sharing redundant or 
supplementary resource—or heterogeneous (diverse) ones—sharing complementary 
resources. In other words, our results indicate that the best option is to have an alliance 
portfolio profile specialized either in link alliances or in scale alliances. The decision 
will depend on the alliance’s previous experience. 
However, it may also be because market resources have been used and, due to these 
sorts of resource characteristics, that it is positive to gain both supplementary and 
complementary resources. Therefore, airlines will be interested in gaining their partner’s 
new destinations not only to complete their operational network but also to access the 
destinations, through partner resources, that these airlines already have but which 
increase the flight frequency and the possibilities of onward connections. Moreover, the 
results also showed that at very high percentages of complementarity, the results also 
improve, referring directly to the synergy and the arguments advanced in a large part of 
the previous literature (Chung et al., 2000; De Leeuw et al., 2014; Kale & Singh, 2009; 
Wassmer, 2007; Zheng et al., 2013).  
With regard to heterogeneity, it was possible to neither demonstrate that the best 
operative results are produced when the partners differ greatly from the focal firm nor 
demonstrate that greater partner heterogeneity will achieve, as a result, more 
complementary network resources. Both these relations have been emphasized in a large 
part of the previous literature. Furthermore, in line with many studies in the literature, 
which associate the alliance portfolio diversity with greater network resource 
complementarity and state that this diversity leads to a better performance, the data on 
the alliance portfolio obtained from the codeshare alliances showed no direct relation 
between alliance portfolio diversity and performance; however, the effects of mediation 
do appear, which point to the indirect influence of diversity on performance through 
access to complementary network resources (H4b and H5b). These results highlight the 
central role of obtaining partner resource complementarity as a pivotal element in the 
alliance portfolio construction. 
The main contributions of this work are two-fold. First, the differences between a 
focal firm and its partners in characteristics—partner heterogeneity—affect company 
performance in a positive way nor the key network resource that are complementary to 
the focal firm resource, whereas the diversity or variety between partners within a 
portfolio—alliance portfolio diversity—positively influence both performance (in an 
indirect manner) and the complementarity network resource achievement. This idea 
suggests that the effect of divergences or differences is more powerful and positive at 
the egonet level than at the dyadic relation level with the focal firm. Therefore, the 
arguments linked to the egonet structure should prevail in the analysis of the alliance 
configuration (Burt, 1992; Gulati, 1995). Second, the more complementary the alliance 
resources, the better the firm performance. It appears that the network resource 
complementarity has an important weightage in the relation. In other words, a relevant 
factor for the performance improvement in the alliance portfolio configuration is to 
achieve access to network resources that are complementary to the firm resource 
endowment and that may be achieved with a more diverse and varied alliance portfolio. 
This observation implies situating the network resources at the center of the analysis of 
the portfolio configuration, proposing that the factors linked to the partner 
characteristics and to their own resources can have a more important effect on 
performance compared to others that were analyzed more widely by Network Theory, 
such as network structure and the partner relationship intensity (Gulati, 2007; Lavie, 
2008). Previous studies that used the same definition of network resources (Lavie, 
2008) have shown that their access improved the company’s performance (Casanueva et 
al., 2013; Lavie, 2007), but they did not include any analysis of whether those network 
resources were complementary to the focal firm’s resources. 
In line with the studies by Kim (2014), Wassmer (2007) or Zheng et al. (2013), these 
results support the idea that complementarity influences the economic performance 
achievement in a positive way. In addition, it has an indirect influence on the relation 
between diversity and results because it is important to possess different and 
complementary results, as Lin (2012) and Sakakibara (1997) have argued. 
Therefore, as maintained by the proposed hypotheses, the data have shown that 
having a very diverse alliance portfolio in no way implies excessive expenditure on 
tasks related to coordination to overcome all difficulties (De Leeuw et al., 2014; 
Duysters & Lokshin, 2011; Faems et al., 2010; Lahiri & Narayanan, 2013; Park et al., 
2014).  
This work has shown that the physical and market resource complementarity in 
alliances may, in an acceptable way, combine associations with highly divergent 
partners. These results set out the need to research other industries, with physical 
resources and resources related to knowledge and innovation. Unlike earlier studies, 
alliance portfolio diversity and partner heterogeneity within the same industry have 
been studied by analyzing subsector membership or segments rather than interindustry 
differences.  
At a theoretical level, our research has contributed to the better knowledge of 
various important issues raised in the strategic literature. First, a conceptual clarification 
has been made of the three principal sources of portfolio divergence that are linked to 
network resources. This will mean that we may advance with the proposed research 
agenda in a more orderly manner (Gulati et al., 2011; Wassmer, 2010). Second, the 
implications of the study have pointed toward situating alliance management within a 
suitable analysis of the network resources that are sought and shared within the alliance 
(Gulati, 2007; Lavie, 2008). An acceptable analysis of network resources with regard to 
typology, endowment, accumulation, access, and mobilization by partners will permit 
the maximum exploitation of both synergies and complementarity, thereby improving 
firm performance and achieving competitive advantages (Gulati et al., 2011). Third, as 
this work has highlighted, the consideration of physical and market resources can be 
very relevant when studying firm behavior in terms of their interorganizational ties, as 
opposed to a large part of the literature that has focused (and it has generated theory) on 
intangible resources. 
Our study also has implications for practice. Accordingly, on the one hand, firms 
should form alliances with other companies unlike themselves to obtain better 
performance, and on the other hand, they should search for partners endowed with 
complementary resources to improve their performance. This recommendation sets out 
the need for global alliance portfolio management to have a place in the firm, whether 
through line managers or specific department work, similar to that in some firms and 
particularly in the industry under study (De Man, Roijakkers, & De Graauw, 2010; Dyer 
et al., 2001; Faems et al., 2010; Kale et al., 2002). 
The study also presents a series of limitations. First, only one resource has been 
analyzed to study complementarity. Despite it being a very relevant industry resource 
(Wassmer & Dussauge, 2012), which is the principal motive for forming the type of 
alliances under consideration, i.e., codeshare, the information that relates to the variable 
network resource complementarity has, it appears, been excessively influenced by this 
relevance. Second, the indicators used to measure the three concepts (partner 
heterogeneity, alliance portfolio diversity, and network resource complementarity) that 
have been analyzed were the researcher’s choice. Other firm characteristics and other 
types of measures to confirm differences and similarities may be considered. Equally, a 
further limitation of our research is that we gave no consideration to other alliances 
except codeshares so that each airline alliance portfolio under study is really complete. 
Another limitation is that most of the heterogeneity and diversity indicators are related 
to firm size (number of employees, number of destinations, and fleet size), and they are 
correlated. Finally, the chosen industry is complex as it brings together very different 
firms and their particular circumstances about competence and globalization, which 
may perhaps be reflected in the results.  
Future lines of research will mainly seek to tackle these limitations. For example, 
our study could be repeated in another industry—other than airlines—and in a particular 
airline company segment to test the results. A second research line would be the 
consideration of other types of intangible resources, as new arguments may arise to 
establish differences in the relations, thus paying attention to the type of resources under 
consideration and confirm how the results obtained from the context under analysis fit 
in with the previous literature. Moreover, other indicators could also be used for the 
variables that were employed. In addition to seeking alternative means of measurement, 
it would be interesting to find a way of measuring the partner’s willingness to join the 
alliance portfolio. Another limitation was that we worked by taking secondary data into 
account. An interesting research line would be the inclusion of other types of alliances, 
whether horizontal, such as frequent flyer programs, or vertical, and alliances with firms 
from other sectors. This approach would permit new divergence sources to be included 
in the alliance portfolio as done in previous research (Duysters & Lokshin, 2011; Lavie 
& Miller, 2008) or include the interesting question of multiplexity in the alliance 
portfolio (Cui & O’Connor, 2012; Sarkar et al., 2009). Finally, it would be interesting to 
include other ways of considering the differences proposed by network approach, such 
as structural heterogeneity (Ahuja et al., 2009), cultural distances (Lavie & Miller, 
2008), and multiplexity in strategic alliances (Cui & O’Connor, 2012). 
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Appendix: Existing conceptualizations of divergence or difference in Alliance 
Portfolios 
 
Study Concept Definition 
Gulati et al. (2011) Heterogeneity 
(difference) 
How different the organization is from its partners. 
Phelps, Adams & 
Bessant (2007) 
Heterophily The degree to which certain attributes of interacting entities differ 
Beckman & Haunschild 
(2002) 
Network Partners' 
Heterogeneity 
Variety of partners’ experiences 
Lin (2012) Partner 
heterogeneity 
The breadth or diversity of the complementary capabilities held by different 
alliance participants 
Cui & O'Connor (2012) Functional 
heterogeneity 
The degree to which different alliances do not share common activities 
Collins & Riley (2013) 
 
Alliance Portfolio 
Diversity 
The extent of variance in a focal firm’s alliance partners 
Jiang et al., (2010) 
 
Partner Diversity The degree of variance in partner resources, capabilities, knowledge, and 
technological bases 
Caner & Tyler (2013) 
 
Alliance Portfolio 
Diversity 
Diversity in partner types (e.g., competitor, customer, foreign) 
De Leeuw et al. (2014) Alliance Portfolio 
Diversity 
The diversity of firms' alliances types (different categories of firms, 
universities, and other research or technology institutions) 
Nieto & Santamaría 
(2007) 
Diversity of 
partnership network 
A wide range of external actors 
Parkhe (1991) Type I diversity The reciprocal strengths and complementary resources offered by the alliance 
partners 
Parkhe (1991) Type II diversity The differences in partner characteristics 
Cui & O'Connor (2012) Resource diversity The degree to which the resources of different partners in an alliance 
portfolio are different 
Vanhaverbeke, Gilsing, 
Beerkens & Duysters 
(2009) 
Diversity The heterogeneity of resources or knowledge 
Goerzen & Beamish 
(2005) 
Alliance Network 
Diversity 
Variance in partners’ resources, capabilities, and industrial backgrounds 
Kale & Singh (2009) Partner 
complementarity 
The extent to which a partner contributes nonoverlapping resources to the 
relationship 
Abuzaid (2014) Partner 
complementarity 
The degree to which a partner shares nonoverlapping resources with the 
alliance 
Zahra & George (2002) Knowledge 
complementarity 
The extent to which knowledge is related to and at the same time different 
from knowledge of contacts 
Rothaermel & Boeker 
(2008) 
Complementarity Nonoverlapping niches… Different competences along the value chain 
Zheng et al. (2013) Complementarity The return from the pooled resource stocks is larger than the sum of returns 
obtained from the individual endowments of each firm 
Dyer & Singh (1998) Complementary 
resource 
Distinctive resources of alliance partners that collectively generate greater 
rents than the sum of those obtained from the individual endowments of each 
partner 
 
